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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence.
The state contends that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative stop of Fairchild and, even if the stop was not justified, the discovery
of an outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance justifying
Fairchild’s arrest and search incident thereto.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A concerned citizen called the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office to report a
suspicious “transaction” occurring behind his house and to request that an officer
be sent. (State’s Exhibit 2.) The citizen gave the dispatch operator his name,
address and phone number. (Id.) He reported that two cars pulled up “really
fast” to the dead end behind his house, and the drivers met and were sitting in
one of the vehicles.

(Id.)

The location was one where the citizen noticed

suspicious activity in the past. (Id.) He described the vehicles, a truck and a
sedan, including the license plates. (Id.) The men had been sitting in the truck
for about ten minutes. (Id.)
A Caldwell police officer responded to the location reported by the citizen.
(Tr., p. 19, L. 25 – p. 21, L. 10.) While en route the officer ran the plate numbers
provided by the citizen and the one belonging to the truck showed the vehicle
registered to a person the officer had previously found in possession of drugs
and paraphernalia. (Tr., p. 25, L. 18 – p. 28, L. 17.) The officer entered the
vicinity and confirmed the presence of the two vehicles. (Tr., p. 22, L. 24 – p. 23,
1

L. 19.) Once the officer arrived, the truck drove off through a field and the sedan
drove off on the road. (Tr., p. 23, L. 20 – p. 24, L. 18.)
The officer stopped the sedan and contacted its driver, the defendant
Taylor Fairchild. (Tr., p. 28, L. 23 – p. 32, L. 11.) After ascertaining Fairchild’s
identity the officer contacted dispatch, who informed him that Fairchild “had a
warrant.” (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 8-23.) While dispatch confirmed the warrant (meaning
pulled the actual paperwork “to verify that the warrant is still valid and not just in
their database”) the officer took Fairchild into custody, searched him, and
discovered methamphetamine in his pocket. (Tr., p. 34, L. 23 – p. 35, L. 5; p. 36,
L. 16 – p. 41, L. 2.)
The state charged Fairchild with possession of methamphetamine.
(R., pp. 14-15.) Fairchild moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of
the stop and search. (R., p. 27.) The district court granted the suppression
motion. (R., pp. 78-94.) The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the order
suppressing evidence. (R., pp. 98-100.)
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ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err when it concluded there was no reasonable,
articulable suspicion for the stop?
2.
Even if the stop was unlawful, did the district court err when it rejected
application of the attenuation doctrine and held evidence discovered as a result
of an arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant was inadmissible?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Concluded There Was No Reasonable,
Articulable Suspicion For The Stop
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to

justify the stop. (R., pp. 82-86.) Review of the totality of the circumstances,
however, shows that the investigatory stop was justified by reasonable suspicion
that Fairchild may have been involved in illegal activity.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” State v.

Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013). “On review of a
suppression motion ruling, this Court will accept the district court’s findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.”

State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410,

283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).
C.

The Totality Of The Circumstances Shows Reasonable Suspicion For The
Stop
“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation

that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). “[T]he Fourth Amendment is
satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe
that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). The court must
“look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the
4

detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). “Although an officer’s
reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal
activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id.
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). “The Fourth Amendment requires
some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”
490 U.S. at 7.

Sokolow,

Furthermore, reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the

possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
The totality of the circumstances included (1) a citizen reporting that a
sedan and a pickup had pulled into the dead end behind his house; (2) this was a
place where he had seen suspicious transactions occur before; (3) one of the
drivers got into the other vehicle where the two men engaged in some sort of
transaction; and (4) the citizen believed that the transaction was suspicious. The
officer (1) confirmed the citizen’s observations of the two vehicles and their
location; (2) ascertained that one of the vehicles belonged to a man with a known
drug history; and (3) when the officer approached, the two vehicles took off, one
of them driving through a field. Although this evidence did not establish that the
two men were involved in a drug transaction by a preponderance of the
evidence, or even probable cause, it was reasonable to suspect that Fairchild’s
transaction in the truck may have involved drugs.
In concluding that the citizen’s and officer’s suspicions that Fairchild’s
transaction in the truck may have involved drugs were not reasonable, the court
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emphasized that the citizen stated that what he saw could be “nothing,” that the
transaction occurred in “a well-kept subdivision on a bright, sunny morning,” that
it was “unclear” whether the registered owner of the truck (who had a known
history of drug use) was the driver of the truck, that neither the citizen nor the
officer saw drugs or money exchange hands, and that the location was not “a
high-crime or high-drug neighborhood.” (R., pp. 85-86.) Although these facts are
part of the totality of the circumstances, they do not show that suspicion that
Fairchild was involved in a drug transaction was unreasonable for two reasons.
First, all of the facts articulated by the district court are consistent with
reasonable suspicion.

The citizen’s acknowledgment that the transaction he

witnessed could have been “nothing” is consistent with reasonable suspicion
because, even if there was more than a 50% chance the transaction was
“nothing,” suspicion can still be reasonable. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (evidence
establishing reasonable suspicion less than required for probable cause and
“considerably short” of a preponderance). Likewise, even assuming that drug
transactions often happen at night or in high-crime areas, absence of these
factors does not render suspicion unreasonable.

Indeed, the facts in Terry

warranting a determination of reasonable suspicion were that an officer saw two
men conferring on a street corner, then take turns walking up the street to a store
300 to 400 feet away and looking in a window before returning to the corner,
something that both men did five or six times.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.

addressing Terry the Court stated:
Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and
susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two
6

In

individuals pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the
window and periodically conferring. All of this conduct was by itself
lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the
store for a planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers
could detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citations omitted); see also
Navarette v. California, ___ U.S.___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014) (“we have
consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct” (quotations omitted)); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10
(reasonable suspicion existed even though facts were “consistent with innocent
travel”). The district court’s concerns that the events witnessed by the citizen
and the officer may have been “nothing,” that they occurred during daylight in a
relatively drug- and crime-free neighborhood, and that neither the citizen nor the
officer saw the actual transaction (which occurred inside a car) did not render
their suspicions unreasonable.
Second, the district court failed to address several of the circumstances in
the totality. As noted above, Fairchild conducted some sort of transaction that a
nearby resident found suspicious, spending about ten minutes in a truck
registered to a man with known drug affinity, in a place where other suspicious
transactions had been observed, and both men left in different directions when
an officer approached—the man in the truck driving away through a field rather
than on the road. One rational inference from these facts is that the transaction
Fairchild participated in involved controlled substances. See State v. Danney,
153 Idaho 405, 409–10, 283 P.3d 722, 726–27 (2012) (“A reasonable suspicion
exists when the officer—or officers—can articulate specific facts which, together
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with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion that
criminal activity is occurring.”). The district court erred when it concluded that the
investigative stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion.
II.
Even If The Stop Was Unlawful, The District Court Erred When It Rejected
Application Of The Search Incident To Arrest Exception And The Attenuation
Doctrine
A.

Introduction
Even if the traffic stop were not justified by reasonable suspicion, the

methamphetamine should not have been suppressed because it was found as
the result of a proper arrest on an existing arrest warrant. The district court
rejected both the search incident to arrest exception and the attenuation doctrine
based on the erroneous determination that the arrest warrant was not discovered
until after the officer had taken Fairchild into custody and searched him.
(R., pp. 86-93.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin,
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014).
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C.

Evidence Found As A Result Of Fairchild’s Arrest Was Admissible
Regardless Of The Initial Legality Of The Traffic Stop
After making the traffic stop and acquiring Fairchild’s identification,

dispatch informed the officer of an outstanding arrest warrant for Fairchild. (Tr.,
p. 34, Ls. 8-23; State’s Exhibit 3.) The officer then took Fairchild into custody
and discovered methamphetamine in his pocket. (Tr., p. 34, L. 23 – p. 35, L. 5;
p. 36, L. 16 – p. 41, L. 2; State’s Exhibit 3.)

The methamphetamine was

therefore found as part of a valid search incident to arrest.

See Chimel v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874,
11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000). The discovery and execution of a valid arrest
warrant, leading to the discovery of contraband, required application of the
attenuation doctrine and the conclusion that the contraband was not subject to
the exclusionary rule even if the initial investigatory stop was not justified by
reasonable suspicion.
The exclusionary rule applies to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
an illegal search or seizure. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).
One of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the attenuation doctrine:
“Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police
conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
Utah v. Strieff, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (internal quotations
omitted).
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The three factors a court considers under an attenuation analysis include:
(1) the “temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the
discovery of evidence”; (2) “the presence of intervening circumstances”; and
(3) “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at
2062 (citations omitted, punctuation altered); see also State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004) (citation omitted). Applying these factors in
Strieff, the Court found suppression was not appropriate, reiterating that
“[s]uppression of evidence has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”
Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2061 (quotations, citation and ellipses omitted).
In Strieff, a narcotics detective was investigating a tip that there was
“‘narcotics activity’ at a particular residence.” 136 S.Ct. at 2059. During the
detective’s surveillance of the residence, “[h]e observed visitors who left a few
minutes after arriving at the house,” which behavior was indicative of drug
dealing. Id. The detective “observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a
nearby convenience store.” Id. Once in the store’s parking lot, the detective
“detained Strieff, identified himself, and asked Strieff what he was doing at the
residence.”

Id.

“As part of the stop,” the detective “requested Strieff’s

identification,” which Strieff provided, and the detective “relayed Strieff’s
information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding
arrest warrant.” Id. The detective arrested Strieff and, pursuant to a search
incident to that arrest, he discovered methamphetamine. Id. Strieff moved to
suppress the methamphetamine, “arguing that the evidence was inadmissible
because it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop.” Id.
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Addressing Strieff’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court noted
that the attenuation doctrine is one exception to the exclusionary rule. Strieff,
136 S.Ct. at 2061.

But, first, the Court addressed the “threshold question:

whether this doctrine applies at all to a case like this, where the intervening
circumstance that the State relies on is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and
untainted arrest warrant.” Id. The Court “conclude[d] that the warrant breaks the
causal chain.” Id. at 2062. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the
“warrant was valid,” it predated the detective’s investigation, and “it was entirely
unconnected to the stop.” Id. Moreover, once the warrant was discovered, the
detective “had an obligation to arrest Strieff.” Id. “And once Officer Fackrell was
authorized to arrest Strieff, it was undisputedly lawful to search Strieff as an
incident to his arrest.” Id. at 2063.
With respect to the flagrancy prong, the Court found that the detective
“was at most negligent.” Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2063. According to the Court, the
detective made “two good-faith mistakes” in stopping Strieff, one of which was
that he “should have asked Strieff whether he would speak with him, instead of
demanding that Strieff do so.” Id. at 2063. The other “mistake” was that the
detective did not know how long Strieff had been inside the suspect residence
before leaving. Id. However, “these errors in judgment hardly rise to purposeful
or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”

Id.

While the

detective’s “decision to initiate the stop was mistaken, his conduct thereafter was
lawful,” including the check for warrants, which was a “negligibly burdensome
precaution.” Id. (quotations, citation and brackets omitted). “Moreover,” there
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was no indication that the stop “was part of any systematic or recurrent police
misconduct.” Id. Rather, the evidence “suggest[ed] that the stop was an isolated
instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation
of a suspected drug house.” Id. As such, there was no purposeful or flagrant
misconduct. Id.
In holding that “the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the
unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest,” the Court
also rejected Strieff’s argument that the detective’s conduct “was flagrant
because he detained Strieff without the necessary level of cause (here,
reasonable suspicion).” Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056. As noted by the Court, such an
argument “conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the standard for
flagrancy.” Id. “For the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is
required than the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.” Id.
Similar to Strieff, this Court applied the attenuation factors in Page to
conclude that suppression was not warranted. In Page, an officer approached a
pedestrian who “was walking down the middle of a roadway carrying some bags”
at 2:00 a.m. Page, 140 Idaho at 842, 103 P.3d at 455. The officer asked to
speak with Page, and asked him for identification. Id. After Page provided his
license, the officer took it back to his patrol car to “check his name with the
station to let them know who he had stopped.” Id. Dispatch reported that Page
had an outstanding warrant. Id. Page was arrested on the warrant and a search
incident to arrest revealed drugs and paraphernalia. Id. This Court ultimately
concluded that Page was not entitled to suppression even though the officer
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improperly detained Page by taking his license without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to support a detention. Specifically, the Court stated:
Here, there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the
license and the search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. The
police officer’s conduct was certainly not flagrant, nor was his
purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer discovered that there
was an outstanding warrant, an intervening event . . ., he did not
have to release Page and was justified in arresting him at that
point.
Page, 140 Idaho at 846-847, 103 P.3d at 459-460.
The present case is indistinguishable from Strieff and Page. The officer
stopped Fairchild based on a report of suspicious activity, at least partly
confirmed by the officer’s own observations. (Tr., p. 28, L. 23 – p. 32, L. 11.)
After detaining Fairchild the officer obtained Fairchild’s identification and
contacted dispatch, who informed him that Fairchild “had a warrant.” (Tr., p. 34,
Ls. 8-23.) After learning of the arrest warrant from dispatch the officer took
Fairchild into custody and searched him incident to arrest, discovering
methamphetamine in his pocket. (Tr., p. 34, L. 23 – p. 35, L. 5; p. 36, L. 16 –
p. 41, L. 2.) Just as in Strieff and Page, even assuming the stop was not justified
the three factors show attenuation: the time was short, but the discovery of an
outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance and the officer did
not act in any way flagrantly.
The district court’s rejection of the search incident to arrest exception and
the attenuation doctrine was based on the clearly erroneous finding that “the
warrant was discovered after the Defendant had been unlawfully arrested.”
(R., p. 92 (emphasis original).) The evidence in the record, however, clearly

13

shows that the officer handcuffed and searched Fairchild only after dispatch
informed him of the arrest warrant. (Tr., p. 34, L. 23 – p. 35, L. 5; p. 36, L. 16 –
p. 41, L. 2; State’s Exhibit 3.) Dispatch informing the officer of an arrest warrant,
leading to arrest and search incident thereto, was the salient intervening
circumstance in Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2060 (“Officer Fackrell relayed Strieff’s
information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding
warrant”), and Page, 140 Idaho at 843 (“Officer Marshall was then told by
dispatch that Page had an outstanding warrant for his arrest”).

There is no

evidence tending to show that dispatch informed the officer of the search warrant
only after the officer took Fairchild into custody and searched him. Because the
evidence was obtained pursuant to a search incident to arrest following the
discovery of a valid, preexisting arrest warrant, the district court erred in finding
the search incident to arrest exception and the attenuation doctrine inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s
order suppressing evidence.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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